Mullen v. Mullen

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STARLIE MULLEN,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.

TRAVIS MULLEN, et al.,
Defendants/Appellants.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0361
FILED 10-28-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2025-006255

Manistee (Glendale) Justice Court
No. CC2025017011EA

The Honorable Brian J. Palmer, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Travis Mullen, Glendale
Defendant/Appellant

Starlie Mullen, Glendale
Plaintiff/Appellee
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Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

T H U M M A, Judge:

¶1 Defendant Travis Mullen (Travis) appeals from an order of
eviction in favor of plaintiff Starlie Mullen (Starlie).1 Travis argues that the
superior court failed to acknowledge the basis for the transfer from justice
court to superior court and improperly refused to resolve Travis’
counterclaims. Because Travis has shown no error, the superior court’s
rulings are affirmed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Starlie and Travis entered into a month-to-month rental
agreement in June 2024. The rental agreement required Travis to pay $600
on the first of the month to Starlie, who was the landlord. In February 2025,
after Travis failed to comply with a notice of failure to pay rent, Starlie filed
this eviction action in justice court claiming that Travis had not paid rent
since December 2024. Travis tried to dispute title, claiming a fraudulent
deed. The justice court then transferred the case to superior court. Travis
filed an answer, asserting various affirmative defenses (including claiming
Starlie had title through a fraudulent deed). Travis also counterclaimed,
alleging Starlie breached the rental agreement through fraudulent conduct.

¶3 The superior court heard testimony on Starlie’s eviction
complaint from Starlie, Travis and Crystal Estes (Estes), who lived with
Travis. The superior court then ruled that Travis did not “create a genuine
dispute as to the validity of the [l]ease,” and concluded that Starlie met her
burden of possession. The court ordered the relief requested in Starlie’s
complaint and denied the relief requested in Travis’ counterclaim without
prejudice, noting that Travis could pursue his claims in a separate civil

1 Given their common last name, this decision uses their first names
throughout.

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action.2 This court has jurisdiction over Travis’ timely appeal pursuant to
Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised
Statutes (A.R.S.) §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and -2101(A)(1)(2025).3

DISCUSSION

I. The Superior Court Properly Limited the Proceedings.

¶4 Travis argues that, following transfer from the justice court,
“the core issue concerned ownership and title, not possession.” After
transfer, he argues, the superior court was “required to treat the case in
accordance with the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure.” This eviction
action, however, is governed by the Arizona Rules of Procedure for Eviction
Actions, which generally provide that the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure
“apply only when incorporated by reference.” Ariz. R.P. Evic. Act. 1; see also
Bank of New York Mellon v. Dodev, 246 Ariz. 1, 8 ¶ 22 (App. 2018). Travis has
shown no incorporation by reference that would alter the result here.

¶5 Travis next argues that the superior court failed to “recognize
the procedural and legal implications of the transfer” and that treating the
case as a “routine eviction . . . amounts to reversible procedural error.”
Having title litigated separately, Travis adds, “ignores Arizona’s equitable
doctrine: a claimant relying on void instruments possesses no legal
standing to enforce eviction.” Travis further argues that Arizona “explicitly
authorizes courts to set aside such fraudulent instruments even within
eviction proceedings when title validity directly impacts the right of
possession.”

¶6 In eviction actions like this one, “the only issue” to be tried
“shall be the right of actual possession and the merits of title shall not be
inquired into.” A.R.S. § 12-1177(A); see also Curtis v. Morris, 186 Ariz. 534,
534 (1996). This procedure provides “a summary, speedy and adequate

2 Travis filed a separate civil action, CV2025-018484, pressing the
counterclaims the court here dismissed without prejudice. This court has
no appellate jurisdiction over that separate civil action. Accordingly, to the
extent Travis seeks to address issues in that separate civil action in his
“Notice of Supplemental Authority” and his “Renewed Motion for Limited
Remand Based on Due Process and Real Party in Interest Grounds,” such
requested relief is denied.
3 Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited

refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated.

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Decision of the Court

remedy for obtaining possession of the premises withheld by a tenant.”
Olds Bros. Lumber Co. v. Rushing, 64 Ariz. 199, 204 (1946).

¶7 Here, both Starlie and Travis testified that they entered into a
lease for the property. Travis admitted that $600 in monthly rent “was what
[they] agreed upon.” Travis admitted that he had failed to pay rent since
December 2024. And Starlie testified that she had a deed showing she was
the owner of the property. This evidence allowed the superior court to
conclude that a lease existed between the parties, and that Travis breached
the lease by failing to pay rent, and to grant Starlie’s requested eviction,
recognizing “the merits of title shall not be inquired into” during an
eviction proceeding. A.R.S. § 12-1177(A); accord Olds Bros., 64 Ariz. at 208
(when such evidence is provided, “title to the property shall not be raised
nor made an issue”).

¶8 Moreover, Travis has shown no error in the court’s finding
that “none of the materials submitted by [Travis] create[d] a genuine
dispute as to the validity of the [l]ease,” and that “[Starlie] ha[d] met her
burden of possession.” See Carrington Mortg. Servs. LLC v. Woods, 242 Ariz.
455, 457 ¶ 12 (App. 2017) (plaintiff has burden to show “a superior right of
possession to the property”); Colonial Tri-City Ltd. P’ship v. Ben Franklin
Stores, Inc., 179 Ariz. 428, 433 (App. 1993) (plaintiff must show existence of
a lease).

¶9 The record shows that, when asked why he had failed to pay
rent, Travis stated that when he heard Starlie wanted to sell the home, he
wanted to buy the home but was told there were issues with the title. Travis
then agreed that his position was that the lease was not enforceable because
Starlie “doesn’t hold title to the property.” But, again, “merits of title shall
not be inquired into” in an eviction action. A.R.S. § 12-1177(A). For these
reasons, Travis has failed to show that the superior court erred in limiting
the nature of the proceedings.

II. The Superior Court Did Not Err by Dismissing Travis’
Counterclaims Without Prejudice.

¶10 Travis next argues that his asserted counterclaims involving
“notarial fraud and deed forgery,” were “never adjudicated, converted, or
referred under Rule 42(f).” Travis argues that this failure to address the
counterclaims “denied [Travis] a forum for resolution and forced them to
file duplicative civil litigation.” But the Arizona Rules of Procedure for
Eviction Actions state that “[u]nless specifically provided for by statute, no
counterclaims, cross claims, or third party claims may be filed in eviction

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actions. Any counterclaim filed without a statutory basis shall be stricken and
dismissed without prejudice.” Ariz. R.P. Evic. Act. 8(a) (emphasis added).

¶11 Counterclaims that properly can be asserted in an eviction
action are quite limited. See Iverson v. Nava, 248 Ariz. 443, 448 ¶¶ 11-12 (App.
2020). Here, the substance of Travis’ counterclaims turned on whether
Starlie had title, focusing on alleged forged deeds and related alleged fraud.
Indeed, Travis’ claimed harm was that he paid rent under the lease when
Starlie “had no lawful right to collect such payments” given the alleged
issue with the title to the property. These counterclaims, however, are not
based on a statute or terms of the lease and, instead, impermissibly seek to
challenge “the merits of title.” A.R.S. § 12-1177(A).

¶12 In addressing the counterclaims, the superior court properly
noted that “[t]hose sorts of claims generally you don’t do in eviction actions.
You do those in another type of action.” Recognizing the summary nature
of eviction actions, the superior court then properly dismissed Travis’
counterclaims without prejudice, allowing him to refile them in a separate
civil proceeding, which he has done. See Iverson, 248 Ariz. at 448 ¶ 11 (noting
an eviction “action does not bar subsequent proceedings between the
parties to determine issues other than the immediate right to possession,
those issues are better resolved in proceedings designed to allow full
exploration of the issues involved.”) (citation omitted). Travis has failed to
show that the superior court erred in dismissing his counterclaims without
prejudice.

CONCLUSION

¶13 The superior court’s orders are affirmed.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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